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I. INTRODUCTION
While it is generally recognized that domestic relations law differs
significantly between the various states,1 no area of the law is in a greater
state of flux than the anachronistic "interspousal immunity" doctrine.
This concept sets forth the proposition that a tort committed by one
spouse against the person or character of the other, does not give rise to
a cause of action in favor of the injured spouse.' The rule originated at
common law and was adopted by early American courts.
* Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See generally, GOLDSTEIN, THE FAMILY & THE LAW (1965).
2. This concept has been reasoned two different ways with the same result. In Maine v.
James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924), the court held that the
common law freedom of the husband from liability to the wife for a tortious or negligent
injury to her person arises out of the very relationship itself and does not rest merely upon
a lack of remedy. However, in Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940),
the court reasoned that the immunity of a spouse from action by the other spouse does not
mean that there is no right of action, but merely denies the remedy as against the spouse.
Accord, Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Aldrich v. Tracy, 222 Iowa 84, 269
N.W. 30 (1936).
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The injustice of the basic concept precipitated its early erosion. In
the eighteenth century Equity recognized that a married woman could
sue her husband over matters relating to her separate property. By the
nineteenth century, comprehensive legislation was enacted to advance
the general emancipation of married women. However, despite twentieth-
century legislative, economic, social and judicial innovations, the majority
of states while allowing property and contract actions, have still refused
to shed this cloak of antiquity. Few topics reflect greater judicial incon-
sistency, pure unsound reasoning, and such a significant divergence in
judicial treatment. This disparity can be attributed to the "battle be-
tween conflicting conceptions of the family between individual and rela-
tional rights and duties."3
The immunity doctrine is currently in a state of retreat as twentieth-
century logic is forging to the front. Progressive courts are recognizing
the fact that marital harmony, or lack thereof, remains unaffected by al-
lowing a wife to sue her husband. As long as liberal divorce laws exist,
and a husband remains criminally liable for a tortious assault on his
spouse, domestic tranquillity cannot be disrupted by allowance of inter-
spousal tort actions. As was acutely observed in Bogen v. Bogen:4
Whenever a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon,
put out her eyes, broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is
no longer exempt from liability to her on the ground that he
vowed at the altar to love, cherish, and protect her. We have
progressed that far in civilization and justice.5
With the increasing number of family owned vehicles and the ad-
vent of automobile insurance, the immunity concept has taken on new
dimensions of importance. However, even though the possibility of in-
surance fraud exists by allowing interspousal tort actions, modern courts
should not be so inexorably bound by any common law doctrine which
cannot be justified by logic and sound reasoning. The law is not so static
and rigid that it should recognize and adhere to an outmoded concept of
marital relations.6 The purpose of this comment is to set forth the de-
velopment and rationale behind the adoption and abridgement of the
interspousal immunity doctrine as it is applied in various situations.
3. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in a Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030
(1930).
4. 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
5. Id. at 53, 12 S.E.2d, at 651.
6. In Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 286, 218 P.2d 445, 450 (1950), the court declared:
Whatever may be the early common law rule, we should not be bound thereby
unless it is supported by reason and logic. The law is not static. It is a progressive
science. What may have been a wholesome common law rule a hundred years ago
may not be adapted to the changed economic and social conditions of the modern
age.
Similarly, in Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 112, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939), the court stated:
The genius of the common law lies in its flexibility and its adaptability to the
changing nature of human affairs and in its ability to enunciate rights and to provide
remedies for wrongs where previously none had been declared.
[VOL. XXI
1966] COMMENTS
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A. A Common Law Beginning
At common law neither spouse could maintain a tort action against
the other.7 This rule was based on the doctrine that the husband and wife
were one legal person, and that person was the husband.' The origin of
the unity concept has been assigned to a statement attributed to Adam
after the creation of woman from his rib: "This is now bone of my bones
and flesh of my flesh."' Other writers go back to the early Roman era
where the wife had no legal personality of her own.' 0 Wherever its origin
may lie," this unity concept became firmly entrenched in early domestic
relations law.
The first important inroad on the unity concept occurred in situa-
tions where the court upheld the interspousal immunity theory, but not
on the basis of unity of the spouses. In Phillips v. Barnet,12 a divorcee
brought an action against her former husband for an alleged assault and
battery which occurred during coverture. The court held that:
[T]he action is not [denied] because it is one in which husband
and wife ought to be joined, but because husband and wife can-
not contract with or convey to each other . '. ."
In Abbot v. Abbot,14 the court supported the Phillips decision based on
a public policy criteria:
7. Since a married woman at common law lacked the capacity to enter into a contract
or to sue or be sued, it logically followed that she could not maintain a tort action against
her husband. Jewell v. Porter & Rolfe, 31 N.H. 34 (1855); Firebrass v. Pennant, 2 Wils 254
(1764). If a cause of action existed prior to the marriage it was extinguished by the sub-
sequent exchange of vows. Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956); Bohenek v.
Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955) ; Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422,
123 N.E.2d 912 (1955). Also, any right or obligation she had during coverture, an action by
or against her was brought in the names of both husband and wife. Bishop v. Readsboro
Chaik Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 A. 454 (1911); the wife during the marriage was said to
have lost the individual capacity to sue or be sued. Stockton v. Farsley, 10 W. Va. 171, 27
Am. Rep. 566 (1877) ; Norris v. Lentz & Hyde, 18 Md. 260 (1861); Ferrar v. Bessey, 24 Vt.
89 (1852).
8. It was said that since the husband and wife were one person, a person could not sue
himself. Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876); Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep.
27 (1877). In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615 (1910), the court indicated that:
At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one, the legal existence
of the wife during coverture being merged in that of the husband.
9. Genesis 2:23.
10. 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENoLISH LAW 349 (2d ed. 1959).
11. In Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952), the
court stated that:
[T]he historical basis of these rules is a mixture of the Biblical and medieval meta-
physics, the position of the father of the family in Roman law, the natural law
concept of the family as an informal unit of government with the physically
stronger person at the head, or the property law of feudalism.
12. 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
13. Id. at 438.
14. 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877).
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If an assault was actionable, then would slander and liable and
other torts be. Instead of settling a divorce [it] would very
much unsettle all matters between named parties. The private
matters of the whole period of married existence might be ex-
posed by suits.'"
The rationale of these early decisions was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson.'6 In holding that a wife has
no cause of action against her husband for assault and battery, the
Court stated that to allow such an action would
[O]pen the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of one
spouse against the other, and bring into public notice com-
plaints for assault, slander and libel.....
It is interesting to note that while many contemporary courts justify the
existence of interspousal immunity on the basis of unity of the spouses,
early courts began to realize the fallaciousness of this fictitious concept
and resorted to a public policy explanation. However, the majority of
courts today also espouse this public policy argument as a basis for main-
taining the common law position.
Under the immunity concept no cause of action accrues to either
spouse for an intentional tort" or for an injury resulting from negli-
gence.'" Nor can either spouse maintain an action for false imprison-
ment,20 malicious prosecution,2' libel,22 or slander.2 3 This rule was car-
ried to the extent of denying liability on the part of the husband for
deliberately infecting his wife with a venereal disease.24 The doctrine
applies equally whether the tort occurred before or during coverture.2 5
15. Id. at 307.
16. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
17. Id. at 616.
18. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala.
41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Wilson v.
Barton, 153 Tenn. 250, 283 S.W. 71 (1926).
19. E.g., Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Dawson v. Dawson, 224
Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950) ; Kelly v. Williams,
94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933).
20. Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo.
200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
21. E.g., Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932); Watson v. Watson, 39
Cal. App. 2d 305, 246 P.2d 19 (1952); Lapides v. Lapides, 143 Misc. 549, 256 N.Y.S. 798
(1932); State v. Kirby, 167 Tenn. 307, 69 S.W.2d 886 (1934).
22. E.g., Clark v. Clark, 11 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Faris v. Hope, 298 Fed. 727 (8th
Cir. 1924); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1865).
23. Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W. 529
(Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
24. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Schultz v. Christopher,
65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
25. E.g., Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss.
439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Newton v. Webber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (1922).
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Similar4y, an action cannot be brought even after the spouses are di-
vorced.2" However, it should be noted that the wife receives limited pro-
tection from the criminal law, which refuses to adopt the unity concept.27
In addition, evidence of a tort committed during coverture certainly adds
weight to the maintenance of a divorce action by the injured spouse.2S
Thus, the family unity concept provided a major obstacle at common
law for the allowance of interspousal actions. In addition to the meta-
physical anomaly concerning the relationship between husband and wife,
there was the practical problem that any recovery by the wife would im-
mediately become the property of her husband. So in essence the hus-
band would be suing himself, and the action would result in a circuitous
futility.2 With the statutory enactment of the Women's Emancipation
Act, the common law doctrine came under heavy attack.
B. Effect of the Married Women's Emancipation Acts
Over the past one hundred years, the state legislatures, under the
pressure of social and economic progress, enacted the Married Women's
Emancipation Acts. The purpose of these Acts was to relieve married
women of the disabilities of coverture and allow them to independently
hold property and sue and be sued in their own name.30 However, the
overwhelming majority of these statutes are silent as to whether the spe-
cific act will allow an interspousal tort action."' An example of such an
Act is Florida Statute 708.08 which provides that:
26. E.g., Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945) (separation);
Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107
N.W. 1047 (1906); Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
27. E.g., Commonwealth v. McAffee, 108 Mass. 458, 11 Am. Rep. 383 (1871) (homi-
cide); State v. Fulton, 149 N.C. 485, 63 S.E. 145 (1908) (slander); State v. Lankford, 6
Boyce 594, 102 Atl. 63 (1917) (battery).
28. In Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 18, the United States Supreme Court indi-
cated that, apart from suing her husband in tort, the wife is not without remedy for wrongs
committed by him during coverture. See infra note 93.
29. In Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 62, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924), the court gave an
illustration of the circuitous result:
The husband and wife are living together. She recovers judgment against him for
an assault and battery and collects the judgment and puts the money in the bank to
her credit. They continue to live together as man and wife if the lawsuit has not
separated them. Result: The money would still be available for family purposes,
except what had been expended in court costs and lawyer's fees. It would be like
the husband taking money out of one of his pockets and putting it back in another.
Accord, Smith v. Smith, 287 P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955).
30. McCuaDY, Torts in Domestic Relation, in SE.LEcTED ESSAYS ON FAMI.y LAW §§ 167,
179, 180 (1935).
31. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 72 (1946); ArAsK ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-211, 21-212
(1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-401 (1947); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 370 (1956); COLO. Rav.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90-2-6 (1956); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46-9 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-208
(1951); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 5-304 (1955); IND. STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (1949); IOWA CODE R.C.P. 10 (1951); Ky. CWX.
CODE PRAc. ANN. § 404.060 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60.404 (1949); ME. Rav. STAT.
1966]
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Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of,
and manage and control her separate property, to contract and
to be contracted with, to sue and be sued.., without the joinder
of her husband, in all respects as fully as if she were unmar-
ried. 2
The problem then is a matter of statutory construction given to
the particular act in question."3 The viewpoint of the respective statutes
generally depends on whether the court interpreting the Act determines
that the common law unity concept has been either abrogated or pre-
served by the statute. Eight states specifically allow husband and wife
to sue each other, 4 while in six jurisdictions interspousal suits are pro-
hibited by statute.3 5 In only four states, however, do the statutes speci-
fically mention interspousal tort actions.36
As a result of the vague and equivocal wording of the majority of
the statutes, the respective state legislatures have failed to furnish a
basis for the abridgement by the courts of the interspousal immunity
concept. However, it is noteworthy that the promulgation of these Acts
is largely responsible for the great amount of current intramarital liti-
gation.
ANN. ch. 166, § 39 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-658
(1956); MIN. STAT. § 519.01 (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.290 (1956); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-128, 93-2803 (1947) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-305 (1955) ; NEV. Comp. LAWS § 123.120
(1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6-6 (1955); N.D.
REV. CODE §§ 14-0705 (1953); OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (1956); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 224 (1956); ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.010 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-4-14
(1956); S.D. CODE § 14.0207 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-601 (1956); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 4626 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1950);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4749 (1955); Wyo. COmP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-203 (1945).
32. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1965).
33. The courts are in general agreement that under these acts the wife or the husband
may recover for torts committed against property interest. E.g., Notes v. Snyder, 4 F.2d 426
(D.C. Cir. 1925) (replevin); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So.2d 13 (1950)
(conversion); Eshom v. Eshom, 18 Ariz. 170, 157 P. 974 (1916); Larison v. Larison, 9 Ill.
App. 27 (1881) (trespass to wife's land); Moreau v. Moreau, 250 Mass. 110, 145 N.E. 43
(1924) (fraud); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 172 Misc. 118, 13 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1939) (ejectment);
Bruner v. Hart, 178 Okla. 222, 62 P.2d 513 (1936) (unlawful detention of chattels) ; Hall v.
Hall, 193 Tenn. 74, 241 S.W.2d 919 (1951) (unlawful detainer) ; Borton v. Borton, 190 S.W.
192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (waste).
34. A typical statute is Miss. CODE ANN. § 452 (1942) which simply provides: "Husband
and wife may sue each other." Accord, Auz. REV. STAT. ANN. R.C.P. § (17e) (1956); INn.
ANN. STAT. § 2-204 (Supp. 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW
§ 57 (1964); S.C. CODE §§ 10-216 (1952); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.180 (1956); WIS. STAT.
§ 246.075 (1955).
35. A typical statute is ILL. ANN. STAT. 68 § 1 (1953) which provides:
A married woman may in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with
her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried; provided that neither husband
nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture.
Accord, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-511 (1953); HAWAIn REV. LAWS §§ 325-5 (1955); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 209, § 6 (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 372-5 to 372-9 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 111 (1930).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-10.1 (1950); N.Y. Dow.
REL.. LAW § 57 (1964); Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1955).
[VOL. =X
1966] COMMENTS
C. A Rising Minority and Declining Majority
The courts in a majority of jurisdictions have strictly adhered to
the common law immunity rule. 7 However, these courts have attempted
to fortify their position by arguments not propounded in earlier de-
cisions. Aside from the unity concept, the courts have refused to allow
intramarital tort actions on the basis that it would facilitate defrauding
of insurance companies, the domestic tranquillity of the home would be
destroyed, it would lead to a deluge of litigation, there is ample protec-
tion for the spouses through criminal and divorce laws, and that the
changing of the law should be left to the legislature.8" With minor devi-
ation the courts have applied these rationales to intentional torts as well
as premarital torts. 9 Some states, however, admittedly recognize the
fact that the negligent infliction of injury by a husband upon his wife is
a wrongful act. The courts of these states take the position that the stat-
ute does not condone the husband's actions, it merely serves to disable
the wife from suing her mate in tort. The statute, by this view, immu-
nizes the husband from suit by his mate. 0 The tenor of this position was
appropriately stated in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.:41
[A] trespass, negligent or willful, upon the person of a wife,
does not cease to be an unlawful act though the law exempts the
husband from liability for the damage. 2
The ever-increasing minority of states allow an injured spouse to
37. Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 230 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1964); Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F.
Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956); Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Saunders
v. Hill, 202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964) ; Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955) ; Hubbard
v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251, 103 S.E.2d 134 (1958); Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Ill. 2d
190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960); Hary v. Arney, 128 Ind. App. 174, 145 N.E.2d 575 (1957);
Scholle v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.W.2d 902 (1956); Gremillion v. Caffey,
71 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1954); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Ennis v.
Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d
637 (1948); Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Poepping v. Linde-
mann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964); Tobias v. Tobias, 83 So.2d 638 (Miss. 1955);
Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Deatherage v. Deatherage, 328 S.W.2d
624 (Mo. App. 1959); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W.
297 (1927); Morrissett v. Morrissett, 397 P.2d 184 (Nev. 1964); Taibi v. DeGennard, 65
N.J. Super. 294, 167 A.2d 667 (1961); Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400
(1961); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180
A.2d 772 (1962); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 Atl. 357 (1922); Gordon v. Pollard, 207
Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25 (1960); Worden v. Worden, 222 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett,
89 S.E.2d (Va. 1955); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); Goode v.
Martinis, 361 P.2d 941 (Wash. 1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d
406 (1960); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
38. A thorough treatment of each of these policy considerations is given in Section III
of this comment.
39. Infra Section IV.
40. See, e.g., Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958); Hudson v.
Gas Consumers Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, 8 A.2d 337 (1939); Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
41. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
42. Id. at 254, 164 N.E. at 43.
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sue his or her spouse in the same way is if the marriage had not existed."
Even though these courts give a variety of reasons for abrogating the
immunity doctrine, in many instances the result can be traced to the
courts' interpretation of the Married Women's Act. The courts in certain
situations have indicated that if the wife's right to bring a tort action
against her husband were denied, she would be left without a means of
redress." In addition, this surging minority has found blatant fallacies
in the policy considerations set forth by the declining majority.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSMERATIONS
While many courts verbalize about statutory construction of the
Married Women's Act as a basis for their decisions, they often take ref-
uge under the nebulous concept of "public policy." Divergent views have
been reached even though the wording of the respective applicable stat-
utes has been almost the same. Many courts have emerged from the re-
treat of the statutes and have piously indicated that "public policy"
considerations dictate that the immunity concept is sound and should
not be abridged. The more prominent of these arguments, both pro and
con, are set forth below.
A. The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife
As previously indicated, many courts continue to follow the common
law doctrine that the husband and wife are one legal entity.45 Courts
adopting this argument reason that since the Married Women's Acts
are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed and
since the majority of these statutes do not mention interspousal tort
actions,4" the common law unity concept still exists. Other courts sup-
port the unity theory on the basis that since the statutes are silent as
to the husband's rights, the legislature did not intend to give the wife
a right of action while denying the husband the same right.47 Similarly,
43. Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963) ; Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135
So. 481 (1931) ; Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 26
Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962) ; Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Silver-
man v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209
P.2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice,
62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Priddle v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 73, 119
A.2d 97 (1955); Pryor v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 12 Misc. 2d 801, 174 N.Y.S.2d 24
(1958); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920); Damm v. Elyria Lodge No.
465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952) ; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d
660 (1938); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Scotlvold v. ScotIvold,
68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95
N.W.2d 814 (1959).
44. The wife who is injured by fault of her husband is not afforded an adequate remedy
from the criminal or divorce laws. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917);
Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
45. Supra note 37.
46. Supra note 31.
47. In Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911), the court in con-
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it is argued that the common law doctrine is predicated in substantive
as well as procedural rights. The statutory removal of the procedural
incapacity of the wife does not create a substantive cause of action.48
The conception of a legal unity of the spouses grew out of common
law conditions which no longer exist. The harshness of this early doctrine
which rendered the wife little more than a chattel,49 has been greatly
refuted by a modem society which accords a married woman a place of
equality with her husband. The courts have gradually realized the utter
fallaciousness if not total impracticality of applying this rule in a so-
ciety where women actively engage in business, participate in politics,
hold executive positions, contract freely, and generally have the same
rights and incur the same type of liabilities as their male counterparts. 0
As indicated by the court in King v. Gates,5 "the fiction of the wife's
merged existence has long been exploded."52
B. Possibility of Insurance Fraud
As the courts have cogently observed, the modern lawsuit is actu-
ally against the insurance company and not the defendant spouse. These
courts have reasoned that the danger of collusion between the injured
person and the insured is much greater when the parties maintain a close
relationship.5"
struing the Married Woman's Act indicated that when it is conceded that the husband had
no right to sue his wife at common law and has no such right under the statute, it is plain
that no such right is conferred upon the wife. See also, Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100
So. 591 (1924); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906).
48. The court in Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918),
invented a legal peg on which to hang its hat. The court reasoned that in construing the
statute the question is not whether the statute has given married women the same remedies
they would have if unmarried, but whether the statute has conferred on married women the
particular substantive right to sue her husband. The court went on to say that a married
woman may have the same rights as an unmarried woman, but this does not give her the
specific civil right to sue her spouse.
49. BACON, in his Abridgement, TiTLE BARON & FEmwara (- ) states:
The husband hath by law power and dominion over his wife, and may keep her by
force within the bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent and cruel
manner.
50. See Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202,
209 N.W. 475 (1926).
51. 231 N.C. 537, 57 S.E.2d 765 (1950).
52. Id. at 539, 57 S.E.2d, at 767.
53. In Maine v. James Maine & Sons, 198 Iowa 1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924), the
wife was injured due to the negligent operation of an automobile driven by her husband who
at the time of the accident was acting within the scope of his employment. The court in
denying action against the husband's employer stated that:
The occasion for a controversy of this character between parties so related and
associated may be found in the fact . . . that the appellant company carried a
policy protecting it against liability for damages caused by the automobile.
In Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 143, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (1927), the court in holding
that a wife cannot sue her husband for an injury caused by his negligence, indicated that:
We can conceive of circumstances where liability insurance carried by the husband
might prove the moving factor and not at all disrupt connubial bliss in collecting
from an insurance company.
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In Rubalcava v. Gisseman,54 the court in deciding that a wife could
not maintain a tort action against her husband or his estate, stated that
the fact cannot be ignored that where there is insurance and
this is known to both parties, the temptation to collusion exists;
and this is increased when the supposedly adverse parties are
in the symbiotic relationship of husband and wife. The risk
of loss ... may be negligible or nonexistent, and [is] supplanted
by the covert hope of mutual benefit. It is obvious that for per-
sons so disposed, the situation would provide spawn for law-
suits that otherwise would not be brought.5"
However, this rationale presupposes that the courts are so inefficient
and the jury system so impotent, that fraudulent claims cannot be dis-
tinguished from legitimate ones.5"
Many states supporting the majority view have tended to treat the
question of insurance as irrelevant. The courts of these states have taken
the stance that if under the law of the place where the accident occurred
no cause of action exists, any action against the insurance company ne-
cessarily fails.57 They overlook the fact that to allow the maintenance of
the suit against the insurance company presents no problem of marital
discord nor financial harm to the negligent spouse. 58 As the court indi-
cated in Klein v. Klein,5" the allowance of such a tort action
Similarly in Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877), the court stated that to
allow such an action "would allow new methods by which estates could be plundered." And
in Newton v. Webber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (1922), the court indicated that no
wife would want to sue her husband for a negligent tort except as a "raid upon an insurance
company." Accord, Lubowitz v. Taitnes, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935).
54. 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963).
55. Id. at 346, 384 P.2d, at 391.
56. In Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953), the court allowed the wife to
recover from her husband for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The court dis-
posed of the question of possible fraudulent insurance claims by stating that:
The fear that relaxation of the common law rule will open the door to fraudulent
and fictitious claims . . . against insurance companies, has less force than the argu-
ment of domestic peace and felicity. We are not willing to admit that the courts
are so ineffectual, nor our jury system so imperfect, that fraudulent claims cannot
be detected and disposed of accordingly.
Accord, Goode v. Martinis, 361 P.2d 941 (Wash. 1961).
57. Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, 53 A.2d 515 (1947). See also, Burke v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So.2d 875 (1946); Fehr v. General Acc. Fire &
Life Assur. Co., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944). But see, Jacobs v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 2 Misc. 2d 428, 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1956), wherein the court indicated that even
though New York allows an interspousal tort action, there is a state statute providing that
the liability insurer is not liable unless there is an express provision in the policy covering
the injured spouse.
58. In Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 25 N.J. Super. 96, 95 A.2d 494 (1953), the
wife recovered a judgment in New York against her husband for negligence. The court
allowed the maintenance of an action against a New Jersey insurance company even though
New Jersey does not allow suits between the spouses. The court reasoned that there was no
problem of marital discord involved when the suit is brought against the insurance company.
59. 58 Cal. App. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). The plaintiff and her husband went on a
boat trip. In the course of cleaning the exterior deck, the plaintiff fell and broke her leg. She
alleged that her husband negligently caused water to run down the exterior deck and this
was the proximate cause of her injuries. The husband demurred on the ground that in
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would not disturb the family peace and harmony; on the con-
trary, the domestic harmony will not be disrupted so much by
allowing the action as by denying it."'
It is somewhat of an anomalous situation to allow an injured passenger
to recover from the driver's insurance company, but disallow recovery to
a spouse injured in the same accident.
The potentiality of collusion or fraud exists in all litigation and
certainly should not be a valid basis for denying a cause of action. Simi-
larly, the fact that an insurance company is the real party in interest
furnishes no basis for the immunity concept. As appropriately stated by
Justice Traynor in Emery v. Emery:6
[T]he mere possibility of fraud or collusion because of a possi-
ble existence of liability insurance, does not warrant immunity
from liability where it would otherwise exist. 2
C. Disruption of Marital Harmony
One of the major arguments for the preservation of the immunity
doctrine is that allowing interspousal tort actions would encourage the
disruption of marital harmony. 6 In Corren v. Corren,6" the Supreme
Court of Florida elucidated this view when it stated:
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage relationship
were each spouse free to sue the other for every real or fancied
wrong springing even from pique or inconsequential domestic
squabbles one can imagine what the havoc would be to the tran-
quillity of the home. Certainly the success of the sacred institu-
tion of marriage must depend in large degree upon harmony be-
tween the spouses, and the relationship could easily be dis-
rupted and the lives of offspring blighted if bickering blossomed
into lawsuits and conjugal disputes into vexations, if not expen-
sive litigation. 5
California one spouse may not sue the other for a personal tort. The court in holding for
the wife stated that the argument of collusion and fraud against the insurance company as a
bar to such a suit is without merit and not convincing.
60. Id. at 694, 376 P.2d, at 72.
61. 45 Cal. App. 2d421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
62. Id. at 427, 289 P.2d, at 224.
63. In Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858), the court stated:
The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in
an instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal
discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and
murderers.
A large majority of courts that support the immunity concept have elaborated on the
domestic tranquillity argument. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Shiver v.
Sessions, 80 So.2d 905, (Fla. 1955); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923
(1945); David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 AUt. 755 (1932); Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn.
217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 300, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); Lilien-
kemp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915).
64. 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
65. Id. at 776.
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This policy has also been held to apply to suits by a husband against
his wife.66
It has even been extended to antenuptial torts, 7 and situations
where the parties were separated" or divorced.69 In Holman v. Holman"0
the court declared that: "It is as much in the interest of tranquil do-
mestic relationships and unbroken homes to prevent obstructions to the
reunion of separated spouses as it is to guard against separation in the
first instance. '71
This position is incongruous in that when the parties are separated
or divorced the conjugal harmony has been disrupted and the prohibi-
tion of a tort action will certainly not mend the nuptial wounds. It has
logically been asserted that when the real party in interest is the insur-
ance company, conjugal bliss will not be broken by an interspousal tort
action.72 The jurisdictions which refuse to give credence to the domestic
tranquillity argument have also held that death of one of the spouses
eliminates the basis for the marital harmony concept.73 In Pelowski v.
Frederickson7 4 the court in allowing an action against the estate of the
deceased husband, reasoned that the public policy considerations that
exist during marriage do not extend to the estate of the deceased be-
cause death terminates the family relationship.75
The opponents of the "domestic harmony" argument have advanced
several other noteworthy objections. They reason that if a tort has been
committed between the spouses, marital tranquillity has already been
greatly disturbed.7 As indicated by the court in Self v. Self: 77
66. See Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962); Brawner v.
Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. 1959).
67. In Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935), the wife sued to
recover damages for injuries caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by her
husband prior to the marriage. In denying the wife recovery the court alluded to the case of
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 389, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920), wherein it was stated:
[T]he welfare of the home, the abiding place of domestic love and affection, the
maintenance of which in all its sacredness, undisturbed by a public exposure of
trivial family disagreements is so essential to society, demands and requires that no
new grounds for its disturbance be engrafted on the law by rule of court....
68. Infra note 136.
69. See cases in note 127, infra.
70. 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945).
71. Ibid.
72. See Harvey v. Harvey, supra note 53.
73. E.g., Long v. Landy, 60 N.J. Super. 362, 158 A.2d 728 (1960); Johnson v. Peoples
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958). See also, Saunders v. Hill,
202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964) (Wrongful Death Statute creates a new cause of action).
74. 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701 (1962).
75. Id. at 374, 116 N.W.2d, at 704.
76. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (1914) (action by wife for assault and
battery and false imprisonment); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) (wife
seeking damages for false arrest and false imprisonment) ; Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. 1953) (automobile accident).
77. 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962).
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[T]he contention that immunity is necessary to maintain con-
jugal harmony is unsound because after a husband has beaten his
wife there is little peace and harmony left to be disturbed ... "
The proponents of the minority view also point out that where inter-
spousal property actions are permitted, it is just as capable of undoing
conjugal harmony as a tort action.79 Futhermore, as long as the parties
are living in a felicitous and agreeable family environment, the bringing
of a tort action is highly improbable."0 It is only when the "peace" has
been disturbed that litigation will be likely to result. In such an instance
when the purposes of the marriage have wholly failed, an injured spouse
should be able to recover for personal injuries.8 ' The "domestic tran-
quillity" argument is further deflated by the fact that interspousal ac-
tions are allowed in other areas of the law-both criminal and civil law. 2
This point was poignantly evident in Fiedler v. Fiedlerss wherein the
wife alleged that her husband had assaulted her with a shotgun. The
court held that the action could be maintained and stated:
Nor are we able to perceive wherein the sensitive nerves of soci-
erty are worse jarred by such a proceeding than it would be to
allow the parties to go into a divorce court and lay bare every
act of their marriage relation in order to obtain alimony. 4
So as can be readily observed, once the family tranquillity has been
disturbed, the fact that a tort action cannot be maintained will not pre-
serve marital harmony. When analyzed, it is apparent that the source
of marital discord lies not in the court proceeding, but in the wrong which
caused it. Therefore, to urge that the immunity rule survive because it
is an aid to nuptial bliss is to disregard reality. Conjugal peace would
be as seriously impaired by any other civil or criminal action that the
law sanctions. The only effect the "domestic tranquillity" argument
serves is to deny a rightful cause of action to an injured spouse.
D. Trivial Suits and a Deluge of Litigation
Some courts still adhere to the marital immunity rule on the basis
that without it trivial suits would be instituted and the courts would be
78. Id. at 101, 376 P.2d, at 69.
79. As stated by the court in Brown v. Gosser, supra note 76:
The argument would have a truer ring except for the fact a wife may now . . . sue
her husband for tort affecting her property interest. . . . It is difficult to perceive
how a tort action for personal injuries would disrupt the domestic peace and
tranquillity to any greater extent than a tort action for damage to property.
Accord, Muir v. City of Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 Pac. 345 (1922) ; Brandt v. Keller, 413
Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938);
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
80. Brown v. Brown, supra note 76.
81. Id. at 45, 89 AtI., at 892.
82. See notes 93 et seq. accompanying Section III, infra.
83. 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914).
84. Id. at 126, 140 Pac., at 1024.
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swamped with meaningless litigation.8' Typical of this line of thought is
the dissenting opinion in Wait v. Pierce,86 which declared:
The uninvited kiss, no matter how cold and chaste, upon the
unconsenting female brow is an assault and battery, and sub-
stantial damages may be awarded for such. 7
An example of such a trivial action was evident in Drake v. Drake.88 In
that case the court declined to enjoin a wife from nagging her husband.
However, the overwhelming majority of interspousal tort actions are
based on meritorious claims and cases like Drake are a rarity.
The court in Brown v. Brown 9 epitomized the view of the progres-
sive courts.
The danger that ... the courts will be filled with [interspousal]
actions for assault, slander, and libel,... we think is not seri-
ous.90
Similarly in Spellens v. Spellens,"' the court indicated that a suit should
not be denied on the basis that in the future some trifling domestic dif-
ficulties might be the subject of litigation. The argument of "multiplicity
of suits" could be raised in almost any area of the law. Nevertheless, the
courts have almost uniformly refuted this theory. In addition, there is
nothing in the experience of the jurisdictions which have abrogated the
immunity concept that would indicate that court calendars have become
congested with insignificant marital squabbles.9 2
E. Other Adequate Remedies Available to an Injured Spouse
The courts, in jurisdictions which uphold the immunity theory, have
frequently alluded to the fact that remedies other than damages are
available to the injured spouse.93 In Austin v. Austin, 4 the court held
85. See Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898), wherein the court
declared that the result of an interspousal tort action "would be another step to destroy the
sacred relationship of man and wife and open the door to lawsuits between them for every
real and fancied wrong." The United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson,
supra note 63 indicated support of this rationale.
86. 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).
87. Id. at 209, 209 N.W., at 482.
88. 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920).
89. 88 Conn. 42, 89 Ad. 889 (1914).
90. Id. at 44, 89 At. 891.
91. 49 Cal. App. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
92. In Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962), the court in holding that
the immunity rule was no longer valid in California, alluded to the fact that the courts of
the states that have repudiated this ancient concept have not been inundated with trifling
suits.
93. In Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 63, the United States Supreme Court declared
that an injured wife has an adequate remedy in that she may resort to the criminal court for
redress or sue for divorce and alimony. The court also pointed out that the wife has recourse
in equity for protection of her property rights. Accord, Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24
Am. Rep. 27 (1877) (wife cannot sue husband for assault since criminal courts are open to
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that a wife could not bring a tort action against her husband for injuries
resulting from his negligent operation of an automobile. The court de-
clared that:
The divorce courts and the criminal courts furnish ample re-
dress to the hubsand and wife.... Husband and wife ... have
enough grievances for the courts and scandalmongers without
... another being addedY5
This argument was countered in Johnson v. Johnson,98 where a wife
sued her husband for assault and battery. The court indicated that rem-
edies by way of a criminal prosecution or an action for divorce and ali-
mony are illusory and inadequate. Furthermore, as observed in Courtney
v. Courtney,97 these remedies may be adequate to prevent future wrongs
but they certainly do not compensate for past injuries.
The argument that divorce and criminal laws furnish suitable rem-
edies to an injured spouse leaves much to be desired. There are con-
ceivably numerous instances where a wife may not want to inflict her-
self with more misery by criminally prosecuting her husband. A criminal
conviction may in essence deprive the family of its breadwinner and
impose a stigma on the entire family. Also, a wife might not want to
permanently part with her husband through divorce. But the area where
the wife is really left without a remedy is where she is injured due to
the negligent operation of an automobile by her husband. Under these
circumstances how can it logically be argued that the wife has an ade-
quate means of redress? If, however, she were allowed to maintain an
action against her husband's insurance company, just as any other pas-
senger in the car, then she would be justly compensated for her injuries.
If the insurance company wants to exclude the wife from coverage, then
the policy should so state. As can be readily observed, to deny the wife
a personal injury action against her husband, would in many instances
actually leave her without a proper remedy.
F. The Constitution and the State Legislatures
The majority of courts supporting the immunity doctrine have fre-
quently declared that abrogation of this rule is a matter of legislative
concern98 and in this respect the legislatures have remained silent.9 In
an assaulted wife); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (husband cannot
sue wife in tort as divorce court is open to him); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d
595 (1954); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915); Gowin v. Gowin, 292
S.W. 211 (Tex. 1927).
94. 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924).
95. Id. at 62, 100 So., at 592.
96. 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
97. 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
98. E.g., Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App.
721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956); Karalis
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Ensminger v. Ensminger, °00 a wife brought an action against her husband
for injuries sustained when her husband negligently drove an automobile
into a tree. The court, in deciding that the wife could not maintain such
an action, aptly summarized this attitude:
[T]he right of a wife to sue her husband for a tort is brought
with such far-reaching results that the grant thereof should not
be made by judicial fiat, but if such right is to be afforded, it
should be granted only . . . through legislative processes.'
Other courts have reasoned that in deference to the solidarity of the law,
any change by the courts would be justified only to correct patent defects.
Otherwise, it should be made by the legislature so that the courts will
be able to act accordingly. 0 2 Futhermore, it is argued that the constitu-
tional provision of due process of law does not authorize a wife to sue
her husband for a tort, since the tort constitutes no legal wrong. 0 3 The
provision of the Constitution guaranteeing every individual a remedy for
injury to his person, property or reputation, guarantees only all recog-
nized rights, and not a right in every case involving personal injury. 04
Advocates of abolishing the immunity doctrine dismiss the above
argument as merely judicial buck-passing in light of the fact that the
immunity concept was initiated by judicial decree. As is generally known,
the courts are often called on to interpret ambiguous legislative acts. It
is their duty not to shirk this responsibility. In addition, by determining
that the legislature has not decided the question of the immunity rule,
the courts are in essence construing away the changes made by correc-
tive legislation.0 5 The purpose of the enactment of the Married Women's
Acts was to break the shackles of the common law and remove all mari-
tal disabilities. 06 By not recognizing this purpose to its fullest extent,
the courts have actually impeded the legislative processes.
The proponents of the minority position refute the above constitu-
tional argument as purely fallacious. The Constitution provides that no
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W.2d 632 (1942); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d
1084 (1933); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954).
99. See supra note 36 which points out that only four jurisdictions mention interspousal
tort actions in their Women's Emancipation Act.
100. 222 Miss. 799, 77 So.2d 308 (1955).
101. Id. at 801, 77 So.2d, at 310.
102. In Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), a wife sued her
husband's estate for injuries sustained in an automobile-train collision. The Utah Supreme
Court held that the wife could not maintain the suit because among other things the
immunity doctrine is one of legislative concern.
103. Supra note 100. See also, Austin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 105 So. 640 (Miss. 1925)(notation of court: "not to be officially reported").
104. See Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Noonan v. City of Port-
land, 161 Ore. 213, 88 P.2d 808 (1938).
105. See Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
106. See McCuRDY, op. cit. supra note 30.
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process of law, or deny to any person equal protection of the laws. 10 7
This wording is sufficiently broad to include any human being who is
a citizen of the United States. Both the Constitution and the laws of the
various states recognize that a married woman is a person and an indi-
vidual entitled to the same protection of the laws as any other individual.
Therefore, not only have the respective majority of state legislatures
implied that the immunity concept has been repealed, but the constitu-
tional provisions are contrary to the immunity concept and must prevail
over this ancient common law doctrine.
IV. NEGLIGENT TORTS VS. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A small minority of states draw a distinction between actions based
on intentional torts and those predicated on negligent torts.', The cri-
teria for such an intermediate view was lucidly expressed by the court in
Apitz v. Dames:109
[W]hen a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the person of
his wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so dam-
aged that there is no danger that it will be impaired by the
maintenance of an action for damages...
These states while adhering to the immunity concept, concede that the
spouse's exemption from intramarital suits is not absolute."' "In the
case of intentional wrongs, considerations of great potency are involved
which are not present in cases involving negligence only.""' As indicated
by the court in Ennis v. Truhitte,"3 there is in certain types of cases a
trend against the common law immunity.
In Self v. Self" 4 the wife brought an action against her husband to
recover damages for a broken arm received when he allegedly assaulted
her. The California Supreme Court decided to abandon the interspousal
immunity rule where the tort involved was intentional. In the companion
case of Klein v. Klein"5 the same court held that the reasons for the im-
munity doctrine no longer exist and should be repudiated as to negligent
torts as well as intentional ones. The court expounded that if a tort has
been committed then a cause of action exists and there is no logical rea-
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis added.)
108. Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1957); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227
Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961).
109. 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955).
110. Id. at 255, 287 P.2d, at 598.
111. See Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, supra note 108.
112. Smith v. Smith, supra note 104.
113. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1957).
114. 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962).
115. Supra note 92.
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son for drawing a distinction. The jurisdictions which have vitiated the
immunity concept have uniformly adopted this position." 6
The argument in favor of retaining the distinction between inten-
tional and negligent torts was voiced by Justice Schauer in a vigorous
dissent to the Klein decision. He indicated that the rule should be abro-
gated as to intentional torts but not as to negligent torts because:
Accident liability policies do not ordinarily insure against inten-
tionally inflicted injuries, and hence the incentives for trumped
up actions against insurers based on intentional torts are few
or nonexistent. But negligent injuries offer a fertile field for
conjugal collusion and fraud.1 7
To elucidate his point Justice Schauer posed a hypothetical situation:
The wife is shaken up in an automobile accident caused by the husband's
inattentive driving. Perhaps, on reflection, she discovers symptoms of a
whiplash injury. An action for damages is brought nominally against
the husband who, being insured stands only to gain by losing and hence
willingly plays the role of defendant. "The variations of this theme are
limited only by the ingenuity of the parties and the patience of the in-
surance company.""' 8 While Justice Schauer's argument has some merit,
it displays a lack of confidence in the judicial system to ferret out the
false claims from the valid ones. 9
The majority of courts apply the immunity rule to both negligent
and intentional torts. 2 ° However, those courts which have abolished
the rule as to intentional torts, while still applying it to negligence, have
taken a step out of the past.'21 The next logical step for these courts is
to get in line with the progressive courts and repudiate this outmoded
concept in its entirety.
V. EFFECT OF PREMARITAL TORTS
In the jurisdictions that support the immunity concept, the disabil-
ity rule is generally applied to torts committed prior to the marriage as
well as those committed during coverture 22 The reasons normally given
116. Supra note 43.
117. Supra note 92, at 107, 376 P.2d, at 75. Justice Schauer also indicated that the
repealing of the immunity doctrine as to negligent torts should be left to the state legisla-
ture. He felt that judicial interference in this sensitive area of substantive law may have the
same effect it had in Illinois where, within a few months after the Supreme Court of Illinois
judicially abrogated the immunity concept in an action based on willful and wanton conduct,
the Illinois Legislature reinstated the immunity rule as to all personal torts between the
spouses.
118. Id. at 107, 376 P.2d at 76.
119. See note 56 supra.
120. Supra note 37.
121. Supra notes 108 and 109.
122. Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956); Amendola v. Amendola, 121
So.2d 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) ; Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964) ;
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are the same as those advocated in support of the doctrine when the tort
has been perpetrated during the marriage. 2 ' These courts recognize that
a cause of action existed prior to the marriage, but they hold that the
subsequent marriage to the tortfeasor either extinguished or suspended
that right. In Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp.,24 the court expressed the
tenor of this position:
[It] would be . . . illogical . . . to declare that a wife is not a
wife, or suing as a wife, within its meaning, because her action
is predicated upon an antenuptial tort.125
Some courts have allowed a suit based on an antenuptial tort on
the grounds that the wife's cause of action was her separate property,
for the protection of which she could maintain an action against her
husband tortfeasor.12 ' The court in Hamilton v. Fulkeson'21 held that
a wife could maintain an action against her husband for a premarital
tort even though Missouri followed the immunity concept. The court
went so far as to declare that there are no logical reasons based upon
considerations of public policy which would justify extending the spousal
disability to prenuptial torts.'28 Proponents of this position indicate
that it is irrelevant whether or not the suit was instituted prior to, or
after the marriage. 2 9
Thus by holding that a cause of action is a separate property right,
a liberal construction of the Married Women's Act would allow an ac-
tion for personal injuries based on a premarital tort. While the majority
of courts deny such an action in order to remain consistent in policy,
they are in essence dismissing a valid cause of action because the parties
were subsequently married.
VI. WHERE THE MARITAL BOND HAs BEEN SEVERED BY SEPARA-
TION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT
A. Divorce
The fact that the parties have obtained a divorce has not prevented
the majority of courts from applying the immunity rule to actions
Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) ; Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn.
523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935) ; Taibi v. DeGennaro, 65 N.J. Super. 294, 167 A.2d 667 (1961);
Manning v. Hyland, 42 Misc. 2d 915, 249 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Meisel v. Little,
407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962) ; Benevides v. Kelly, 90 R.I. 310, 157 A.2d 821 (1960)
Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1962).
123. See Section III Public Policy Considerations.
124. 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
125. Id. at 5, 141 A.2d, at 38.
126. Carver v. Ferguson, 40 Cal. App. 2d 459, 254 P.2d 44 (1953); O'Grady v.
Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. App.
1956) ; Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840 (1931); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45,
102 S.E. 787 (1920).
127. Supra note 126.
128. Id. at 646.
129. Berry v. Harmon, 329 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. App. 1959).
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brought for torts committed during coverture.'80 In Wallach v. Wal-
lack,"' the plaintiff sued her ex-husband for injuries sustained while they
were married. She alleged that her cause of action was only suspended
during coverture and once the parties became divorced, the right of ac-
tion came into being. The court found for the defendant on the basis
that when the husband and wife are not liable to each other for torts
committed during coverture, they do not, upon being divorced, become
liable to each other. The court added that:
The divorce cannot in itself create a cause of action in favor of
the wife upon which she may sue, where it was not a cause of
action before the divorce.8 2
However, when the husband and wife are liable to each other, a divorce
will not affect this liability. 33
It is obvious that after the parties have obtained a divorce, the
public policy reasons for continuing the immunity rule are no longer
valid. Recent decisions have indicated that the courts are starting to
recognize this fact. In Goode v. Martinis,84 the husband sexually as-
saulted his wife after they were separated but before the final divorce
decree was awarded. After obtaining a final decree the ex-wife brought
suit against her former husband for injuries sustained as a result of the
assault. The court in allowing the ex-wife's action recognized the fact
that
divorce proceedings had already been instituted and the parties
.. . were living apart. It is obvious that there is no domestic
harmony left to be disrupted or destroyed. 13 5
It has also been pointed out that since a divorce dissolves the bonds of
matrimony, a wife's incapacity to sue her husband is ended by the di-
vorce.13 6
There are a small number of cases where the divorced spouse sued
her ex-husband for a tort committed after an interlocutory decree was
obtained but before the entry of the final decree. Prior to the abolition
of the immunity doctrine in California, the court in Paulus v. Bauder,137
ruled that an interlocutory decree did not sever the marital bonds so as
130. Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 230 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Iowa 1964); Lynn v. Gaskins, 212 F.
Supp. 951 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898);
Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Ensminger v. Campbell, 242 Miss.
519, 134 So.2d 728 (1961); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
131. 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956).
132. Id. at 577, 95 S.E.2d, at 751. See also Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep.
27 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, supra note 130.
133. See Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
134. 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961).
135. Id. at 232, 361 P.2d, at 944.
136. Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So.2d 670 (La. 1954).
137. 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P.2d 422 (1951).
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to warrant abridgement of the immunity rule. The court reasoned that
reconciliation of the spouses was possible during this interim and there-
fore the rule was applicable. However, in Steele v. Steele, 3 ' the court
recognized the immunity rule but held that despite the fact that the mar-
riage is not entirely dissolved, the marital relationship on which the im-
munity concept is predicated does not continue during this waiting
period. Similarly in Gremillion v. Caffey,la9 the court held that the wife
could not maintain an action against her husband for a tort committed
when they were legally separated. However, after the decree of an ab-
solute divorce, the ex-wife could maintain the suit.
The policy reasons supporting the immunity theory become aca-
demic after the parties have been divorced or have obtained an inter-
locutory divorce decree. The court's rationale in Goode v. Martinis4 °
appropriately expresses the logic of this position:
Where at the time of the tort the marital relationship of the
parties has completely lost its original character and the parties
have taken concrete legal steps to dissolve the marital relation-
ship together, we can perceive of no convincing reason for de-
priving an injured spouse of his or her cause of action.' 4'
B. Separation
Few courts that recognize the immunity concept will allow the main-
tenance of a tort action while the spouses are separated. 42 The courts
reason that it is as much in the interest of domestic tranquillity to pre-
vent an impediment to the reconciliation of the estranged spouses as it
is to guard against separation in the first instance.4 3 The denial of such
a right can more easily be supported at the separation stage than after
the parties have obtained a divorce. During the legal separation the
marriage is not dissolved, and the wife's disability to sue her husband
for a tort still exists. 44 However, after the divorce, this disability is re-
moved. 45
C. Annulment
Whether the disability rule applies to marriages which are subse-
quently annulled, appears to hinge on whether the marriage was merely
voidable or void ab initio. In Callow v. Thomas,a46 the plaintiff was in-
138. 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946).
139. Supra note 136.
140. Supra note 134.
141. Id. at 945.
142. But see Goode v. Martinis, supra note 134, where the court held that even though
Washington adheres to the immunity doctrine, a divorced wife can maintain an action
against her former husband for a tort committed while the parties were legally separated.
143. Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945).
144. Supra note 137.
145. Supra note 136.
146. 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
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jured when the automobile in which she was a passenger was negligently
driven into a tree by her husband. Subsequently, the marriage was an-
nulled for fraud and the plaintiff brought a tort action to recover com-
pensation for her injuries. The court in denying the plaintiff's cause of
action reasoned that at the time of the accident the parties were husband
and wife. Had no proceedings been brought to annul the marriage, this
status would have endured until the marriage was terminated by death
or divorce. The court intimated that if the marriage was prohibited by
law, that is void ab initio, the interspousal immunity doctrine would not
apply to disable the wife from maintaining a suit.
The court in Gordon v. Pollard147 alluded to the Callow decision by
holding that a subsequent annulment did not entitle the wife to sue her
husband for a tort which occurred between the marriage and the annul-
ment. This court was of the opinion that an annulment of a voidable
marriage did not render the marriage void ab initio for all purposes. 14
However, in Henneger v. Lomas,'49 after the plaintiff obtained an annul-
ment, the court allowed her to maintain an action against her former hus-
band for premarital seduction. The court found that the marriage had
been obtained by fraud and was therefore voidable. But, the majority
view appears to disallow tort actions for subsequently annulled voidable
marriages while allowing such actions when the marriage is void ab
initio. 50
It is obvious that when the parties have separated, divorced or ob-
tained an annulment, the purposes of the marriage have failed. To deny
a cause of action based on public policy considerations geared to pre-
serve marital harmony is totally incongruous. It is more realistic to rec-
ognize the failure of the marriage and allow the maintenance of a suit
as if the conjugal bonds had never been tied.
VII. AcTIONs AGAINST ESTATE OF SPOUSE
The question of whether an interspousal tort action could be main-
tained after the death of one spouse did not arise at common law because
of the general rule that tort actions did not survive the death of a tort-
feasor or his victim.'8 ' However, in many states there are survival stat-
utes or wrongful death acts which allow post-mortem suits. It follows
that if the statute provides that a tort action survives the death of the
tortfeasor, it should equally apply to spouses as well as unrelated parties.
When death has ended the marital relationship, many of the policy
147. 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25 (1960).
148. Id. at 46, 336 S.W.2d, at 26. See also Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Ct. App.
1938).
149. 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896).
150. Supra notes 146 and 147.
151. See Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 166 AtI. 119 (1933).
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considerations lose much of their validity. Some states that support the
immunity concept have held that it is inapplicable after one spouse has
died.'52 In Long v. Landy13 the husband was killed when the automobile
he was driving collided with another vehicle. His wife, a passenger in
the car, was rendered mentally incompetent as a result of injuries sus-
tained in the collision. In her action against her husband's estate, the
court declined to recognize the applicability of the interspousal immunity
theory and allowed the surviving widow to bring an action against her
deceased husband's estate. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowl-
edged the fact that the immunity doctrine is followed in New Jersey.
However, the court reasoned that the public policy which seeks to pre-
vent disharmony in the home has no basis after the death of one spouse,
because there is no longer any matrimonial harmony to be protected.'54
Also, the danger of fraud when the deceased defendant-spouse is insured
has been reduced to such an extent that it cannot be said to exist to any
greater degree than in an ordinary negligence action between unrelated
parties. "It is self-evident that the ground for the special fear of collusion
between the spouses is eliminated upon the death of the tortfeasor.") 55
In Shumway v. Nelson,'56 the statutory trustee of the deceased wife
brought an action against the estate of the deceased husband. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that the action could be maintained even
though the marital immunity doctrine would have precluded the wife
from maintaining an action against her husband. The court reasoned
that since the Wrongful Death Act creates a new cause of action, the rule
of immunity is no longer involved. This was so even though the Death Act
spoke in terms of an action that "decedent might have maintained ...
had he lived."' The court further added that while they believed that
any change in the immunity doctrine was properly a legislative rather
than judicial function,
152. See notes 153 and 156 infra. In Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 At.
663 (1936), both husband and wife were killed in an automobile accident. The court held
that the wife's surviving father could bring suit against the husband's estate because the
parties to the action are free from disabilities. In Robinson's Adm'r v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49,
229 S.W. 1074 (1920), the administrator of the wife's estate was allowed to sue the husband
for the benefit of the minor children. Similarly, in Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d
547 (1951), the husband shot himself and his wife and left a minor daughter. The court in
allowing the administrator of the wife's estate to maintain an action against the husband's
executor stated:
Today the immunity can be based solely upon the ground that domestic tran-
quillity is fostered by the prohibition of actions by wife against her husband. An
immunity based upon the preservation of marital harmony can have no pertinence
in this case, for here the marriage has been terminated, husband and wife are both
dead, and the action is brought for the benefit of a third person.
Accord, Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964); Johnson v. Peoples
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
153. 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961).
154. Id. at 49, 171 A.2d, at 6.
155. Ibid.
156. 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961).
157. Id. at 327, 107 N.W.2d, at 533.
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we do not believe that we should ascribe to the legislature an
intent to extend the intrafamily immunity doctrine to situations
where its existence is without any reasonable justification.' 58
Similarly, in Ennis v. Truhitte,5 9 the wife sued the estate of her deceased
husband to recover for harm caused by his willful, wanton and negligent
operation of an automobile. The court allowed the action on the basis
that the reasons of public policy upon which the immunity rule is based
have vanished when one spouse has died and the Married Women's Act
and the Survival Statute do not preclude a post-mortem action.' 60
Other jurisdictions have found certain policy considerations appli-
cable for continuing the immunity concept after the death of one or both
spouses. 6 ' One of the major factors is the possibility of the surviving
spouse conjuring up false insurance claims against the estate. 62 Another
reason is the temptation to file suit for trivial matters in an effort to re-
cover from the administrator. 6 After the marriage has been dissolved
by death, the bonds of matrimony would no longer inhibit an interspousal
tort action, with the estate as a party, and this would encourage attempts
by the surviving spouse to recover as much as possible from the dece-
dent's estate. Furthermore, the temptation to proffer perjured testimony
is greatest when the claim cannot be rebutted. It is also argued that since
the unity of spouse concept was effective to preclude such suits during
coverture, no cause of action ever arose in favor of the surviving
spouse.' 64 In Saunders v. Hill,6 " the court recognized that the Wrongful
Death Act does create a new cause of action, but denied an action by
the wife's administrator against the husband's estate on the premise
that such right of action is dependent upon the right of the per-
son injured had he not died in consequence of his injury, to
maintain an action for personal injuries.' 66
Proponents of this view have taken the position that the legislative intent
was to prevent a cause of action from coming into being, and under such
a statute a nonexistent cause could not survive the death of a spouse.'67
However, the stand adopted by these courts is somewhat untenable as the
158. Ibid.
159. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1957).
160. Id. at 551.
161. See notes 53 and 85 supra and notes 163 and 164 infra.
162. Supra note 53.
163. See note 85 supra. See also Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920);
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (dissent).
164. See In Re Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927), where the hus-
band intentionally shot his wife and then himself. The court held that no action could be
maintained by the wife's administrator against the executor of the husband's estate. For
authority supporting the unity of the spouses concept in this context, see Castellucci v.
Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1963); Levlock v. Spanos, 101 N.H. 22, 131 A.2d 319 (1957).
165. 202 A.2d 807 (Del. 1964).
166. Id. at 809.
167. See Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 I11. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
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policy factors influencing the preservation of the immunity concept dur-
ing coverture certainly should not be given equal weight after the
marriage has been dissolved by death.
The trend toward interspousal actions for personal torts should be
extended by all the states to instances where the common law immunity
theory is inapplicable and irrational. Each time a common law rule is
utilized it should be carefully scrutinized to insure that social conditions
and policy considerations have not changed so as to make its further
application an instrument of injustice.168 The public policy behind the
rule-legal unity, insurance fraud, preservation of domestic tranquillity,
trivial suits, etc., disappear when the marriage is terminated by death. In
addition, as indicated in Shumway v. Nelson,'69 Death Acts generally
create a cause of action where it was previously nonexistant. Thus the
modern trend is to logically lift the bar of immunity when the marriage
relationship has ceased to exist.
VIII. HUSBAND V. WIFE
In the overwhelming majority of interspousal suits, the action is
brought by the wife against her husband. The courts have had little
opportunity to view the immunity concept when the suit is initiated by
the husband. However, the states recognizing the immunity doctrine
apparently would hold that the disability applies to all interspousal tort
actionsY.7 0 Likewise, the jurisdictions which have abrogated the rule
generally recognize the correlative right of the husband against his wife.
Perhaps the leading case in this area is the Arkansas decision of
Leach v. Leach. 7 In Leach, the husband brought an action against his
wife for damages sustained when the husband's pickup truck collided
with an automobile being driven by his wife on the wrong side of the
street. The court in upholding the husband's right of action pointed out
that the public policy arguments that the court previously rejected in
allowing a wife to sue her husband 172 are equally without merit when the
situation is reversed. Since the legislature provided in the Married
Women's Act that a married woman may "sue and be sued" there can
be no sound basis for a different conclusion when the shoe is on the
168. State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957); Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
169. Supra note 156.
170. In Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. 1959), the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that a husband cannot maintain an action against his wife for a personal tort.
The court indicated that the same public policy considerations which prevent a wife from
suing her husband also apply to an action instituted by the husband, and any change in the
common law rule should be made by the legislature.
171. 227 Ark. 559, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957).
172. See Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916) where the Arkansas
Supreme Court rejected the interspousal immunity rule and allowed a wife to sue her hus-
band for personal injuries.
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other foot. "For in the same breath the legislature abolished her disability
to sue and her immunity from being sued."' 73 However, it is interesting
to note that the courts in two jurisdictions recognized the immunity rule
when the suit was brought by the husband, even though the rule was
rejected when the wife instituted suit.
In Scholtens v. Scholtens,174 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that a husband could not maintain an action for personal injuries suffered
due to his wife's negligent operation of an automobile. The court indi-
cated that the North Carolina Married Women's Act permits a wife to
sue her husband, but contains no provision authorizing the husband to
sue his wife. Therefore, the common law disability still obtained to the
husband even though it had been repealed as to the wife. This same posi-
tion was advocated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Fehr v. General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. The court denied the husband's insur-
ance company the right to recover for personal injuries caused by the
negligent operation of an automobile by his wife on the basis that the
Married Women's Act was passed to broaden the rights and privileges of
married women and not to create and enlarge their liabilities. The result
under this construction of the Act was to remove the wife's disability to
sue but not the husband's. However, after this decision, Wisconsin en-
acted a statute allowing a husband to sue his wife. 176
The position adopted by the North Carolina and Wisconsin courts is
somewhat incongruous. For if the Married Women's Act has abolished
the common law disability rule, then it has done so for the husband as
well as the wife. To construe these acts otherwise would in essence be
giving the wife greater rights than her husband. The purpose of the acts
was to emancipate the wife and to place her on an equal legal plane with
her husband, and not to give the husband less rights than his wife. With
an ever-increasing number of courts abolishing the immunity concept,
this writer believes that the Leach rationale is indicative of the current
progressive trend.
IX. WHERE SPOUSE IS A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
Suppose that a poor man, without liability insurance, is driving
along the highway with his wife as a passenger. There is a collision with
an insured driver due to mutual negligence and the poor man's wife is
injured. When the wife brings suit against the insured driver, the insured's
insurance company will immediately seek to implead the husband claiming
173. Supra note 171, at 17.
174. 230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949).
175. 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
176. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (1957) provides that
A husband shall have and may maintain an action against his wife for the recovery




a right of contribution against him.' If the insurance company is allowed
to do this, a part of anything which any member of the family recovers
will in essence come out of the family purse. In effect the injured wife
would have to pay half of her own claims because her husband was con-
tributorily negligent. 7 ' The majority of states have solved this problem
by denying contribution by the husband on the basis that since the
immunity doctrine precludes interspousal torts, there was never any
common liability between the tortfeasors to furnish a basis for contri-
bution. 17 9 In Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, s0 the wife sued the Cab Co. for
injuries sustained in a collision between a taxicab and an automobile
driven by her husband. The Cab Company filed a cross-claim for dam-
ages to the taxicab and for contribution for any sums recovered by the
wife. The court denied contribution on the basis of the immunity concept:
Contribution . . . depends on joint liability .... Here there was
no liability by Dreslin to his wife .. . and hence nothing to which
a right of contribution could attach...."1
The court used the preservation of domestic tranquillity rationale to
dispose of the argument that it would be inequitable to allow Mrs.
Dreslin to be enriched at the sole expense of the Cab Co. while permitting
her husband who was equally at fault to escape any of the burden.8 2
Similarly in Kennedy v. Camp,'88 the court alluded to the unity of the
spouses concept in not allowing contribution from the negligent husband
of the plaintiff.
The Pennsylvania courts have made an exception to the interspousal
immunity rule where the immune spouse is a third party defendant and
the defendant seeks contribution. 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Puller v. Puller.. allowed contribution by a joint tortfeasor husband even
though the plaintiff wife would be precluded from enforcing liability
against him. The court reasoned that
as between the two tortfeasors the contribution is not a recovery
for the tort but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share
liability for the wrong done.'
177. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Guerriero v.
U-Drive It Co., 22 N.J. Super. 588, 92 A.2d 140 (1952); Pasquinelli v. Reed, 174 Pa. Super.
566, 102 A.2d 219 (1954).
178. This hypothetical situation is posed in 21 NACCA L.J. 365 (1958).
179. E.g., Schroeder v. Longenecker, 7 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947); Scruggs v. Meredith,
135 F. Supp. 376 (D. Hawaii 1955); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954).
180. 181 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
181. Id. at 627.
182. Ibid.
183. 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954).
184. The Pennsylvania courts have been the major proponents of this position. See
Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945) ; Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d
105 (1940) ; Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936).
185. 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
186. Id. at 221, 110 A.2d, at 177.
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This decision exhibits the sound judicial reasoning of the Pennsylvania
courts. The considerations of marital unity and domestic peace under-
lying the ancient immunity concept have no place when either spouse is a
third party defendant. Contribution is an equitable principle of equality
in the sharing of a common burden. It certainly is not equitable for the
defendant to pay one hundred percent of the damages when, except for
the marital relationship between plaintiff and the third party defendant,
he would be contributing fifty percent of the damages. In addition, the
fact should not be overlooked that the injured spouse will recover fifty
percent of the damages if contribution were allowed.
X. VICARIoUS LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF SPOUSE
What effect does interspousal immunity have on the liability of an
employer for the tort of his employee where the employee negligently
injures his own wife? The courts are split on this question. In some states
the employer's liability is denied on the basis that under the doctrine of
respondeat superior there is no liability on the part of the employer
unless the employee is also liable.187 However, the majority of states have
not allowed the employer of a servant who has harmed his spouse to hide
behind the shield of the servant-husband's personal immunity.'88
In Kowaleski v. Kowaleski'89 the court, in allowing the injured wife
to recover against her negligent husband's employer, rejected the argu-
ments that disruption of the family harmony, diminution of the family
wealth and the possibility of collusion should bar a recovery. The court
indicated that the employer does not have a right of indemnity from the
agent-husband, and whether the employer will sue the employee is a
collateral issue that has no bearing on the wife's right to sue the employer.
In answering the argument that the maintenance of such a suit will foster
collusion between the spouses, the court indicated that the same fear
187. E.g., Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956); Myers v. Tranquillity
Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938) ; Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co.,
198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924) ; Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 Atl. 669 (1932) ;
Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940); Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich.
402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216
N.W. 297 (1927); Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932).
188. E.g., Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 Atl. 107
(1930); May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955); Garnto v. Henson,
88 Ga. App. 320, 76 S.E.2d 636 (1953) ; Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507
(1952); Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940); Pittsley v. David,
298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937); Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W.2d 27 (1949);
McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933); Mullally v.
Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936); Miltimore v. Milford
Motors Co., 89 N.H. 272, 197 Atl. 330 (1938) ; Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170
A.2d 241 (1961); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42
(1928); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 194 N.E. 429 (1933); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361
P.2d 64 (1961); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1945) ; Poulin v. Graham,
102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl. 698 (1929).
189. 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961).
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exists in practically all actions. The position advocated by the majority of
jurisdictions was lucidly stated by the court:
[I]t would be a sad reflection upon the courts if a group of
people were injured in one accident by an employee and every-
one injured could recover from the employer but the wife of the
negligent employee."' 0
In Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,' the court speaking
through Justice Cardozo allowed the injured spouse to recover from her
husband's employer on the basis that when the employer commits a tres-
pass by the hand of his servant upon the person of another, the employer
incurs a distinct and independent liability of his own. The court pointed
out that the statute expressly authorizes a married woman to sue persons
other than her husband for personal injuries. Similarly in Tallios v.
Tallios,19 2 the court declared that the husband's immunity from suit is
based on public policy considerations and does not mean that the tortious
act is not unlawful. Therefore, even though the immunity rule denies a
remedy against the spouse, it certainly does not extend to his employer.
The applications of the vicarious liability concept notwithstanding
the immunity rule was carried to the extent of holding a partnership
liable for the torts of one partner where the partner was the spouse of the
plaintiff.'98 In Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 94 the wife of a partner sued the
partnership for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The court
held that the partnership was not immunized from suit even though the
partnership assets could be reached to satisfy the judgment as well as the
private assets of the husband if the partnership assets were insufficient.
The court reasoned that the same considerations which deny the em-
ployer the right to hide behind the family relationship would apply in this
situation. However, some courts still assert that the concept of vicarious
liability is an unjustified means of side-stepping the immunity rule.
The leading case denying recovery is Maine v. James Maine &
Sons. 95 In this case the wife sought to recover from her husband's em-
ployer for injuries received due to the negligence of her husband-
employee. The court in denying recovery extended the immunity rule to
her husband's employer:
Where there is no right of action in the wife for a wrongful or
negligent personal injury inflicted upon her by her husband,
190. Id. at 52, 361 P.2d, at 71.
191. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
192. 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507 (1952).
193. Infra note 194. See also, Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107
N.E.2d 337 (1952), where a wife was allowed to sue an unincorporated association for the
tort of her husband who was a member.
194. 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241 (1961).
195. 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924).
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there can be no liability on his part; and since there is no
liability on his part... his employer cannot be made to respond
in damages to her for his negligent act.'
However, this rationale was rejected in Kowaleski v. Kowaleski'07 as
impeding the march of judicial progress.
A further ground for denying the employer's responsibility was
enunciated in Raines v. Mercer.98 The court in denying the wife's right of
action against her husband's employer held that since she could not sue
her negligent husband directly, if the court allowed such an action it
would be sanctioning an encircling movenient to accomplish what is for-
bidden by a frontal attack. It has also been indicated in opposition to the
allowance of a vicarious suit, that a recovery by the wife would in
essence be benefiting the negligent husband as the funds would go into
the family purse. 9
The principle upon which vicarious liability is based is that the act
of the servant is the act of the master. The courts which would deny an
injured wife the right to recover her husband's employer, are distorting
the immunity concept, and the public policy principles upon which it is
predicated. In addition, these courts overlook the fact that the Married
Women's Acts give a married woman the right to sue. It certainly is not
within the contemplation of the common law immunity doctrine to extend
the wife's disability to those outside of her family. The immunity rule
does not negate the fact that the wife was injured by her husband when
he was acting for his employer. It should not serve to relieve the em-
ployer of his legal responsibility.
XI. FLORmA'S POSITION
The common law "interspousal immunity" doctrine was adopted by
statute in Florida in 1829200 and has remained virtually unaltered by the
enactment of the Married Women's Emancipation Act of 1943."21 Even
though this Act2" 2 allows a married woman to sue or be sued with respect
to her separate property, the Florida courts have taken the position that
the wife is not emancipated from her husband to the extent that she may
maintain a tort action against him.2"8 The Florida Supreme Court in
196. Id. at 1280, 201 N.W., at 22.
197. Supra note 189.
198. 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 283 (1932).
199. Myers v. Tranquillity Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938).
200. The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature . ..are declared to be of force in this state. . . .FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1965). See also
Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
201. FLA. STAT. §§ 708.08-.09 (1965).
202. In State v. Herndon, 158 Fla. 115, 27 So.2d 833 (1946), the Florida Supreme Court
found this statute to be constitutional.
203. E.g., Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d
706 (Fla. 1955); Corren v. Corren, supra note 200. These cases and other Florida decisions
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Taylor v. Dorsey20 4 set forth the posture that the lower courts have
uniformly embraced:
[T]he woman and the man become one person upon marriage,
and that person is the husband .... This unity, or more accu-
rately, merger, has been called the foundation for the rights,
duties and disabilities of marriage.0 5
The reluctance of the State Supreme Court to alter this common law
rule in light of the Married Women's Act was poignantly evident in
Corren v. Corren.2 °6 In this case a wife sued her husband for injuries
resulting from alleged negligent operation of an automobile. After judg-
ment for the husband, the wife appealed on the premise that Florida
Statute 708.08 abrogates the common law doctrine because the Act pro-
vides that she may sue and be sued. The court construed the statute as
applying solely to allowing the wife to exercise control over her separate
property. After a lengthy discussion as to the policy considerations in
preserving the "sacred institution of marriage,"20 the court decided that
if the "interspousal immunity" veil is to be lifted, it is the responsibility
of the state legislature:
208
The legislature will assume grave responsibility when it enacts
that each spouse may treat the other as a stranger so far as legal
rights are concerned; and when it does so, the language pro-
claiming this revolutionary change should be positive and
unambiguous.20 9
The Florida courts have also reasoned that the common law doctrine
should be adhered to on the basis that domestic tranquillity is fostered
indicate that the effect of FLA. STAT. § 708.08 is to emancipate the wife only as to dealings
with her own separate property, and with persons other than her husband.
204. 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876 (1944).
205. Id. at 309, 19 So.2d, at 880.
206. 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950). In the earlier decision of Rogers v. Newby, 41 So.2d 451,
452 (Fla. 1949), the court indicated that not only can a wife not sue her husband in tort, but
the husband is liable for the "pure" torts of his wife. The court sought to justify its position
on the basis that when one contracts with a married woman pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 708.08
he does so voluntarily, but the injury to one derived from a tortious act of the wife is
obviously involuntary on the part of the injured person; therefore, the court reasoned that
the husband would not be liable when one voluntarily enters into a contract with his wife,
but he would be liable if a third party is injured by an involuntary act.
207. When one ponders the effect upon the marriage relationship were each spouse
free to sue the other for every real or fancied wrong springing even from pique or
inconsequential domestic squabbles, one can imagine what the havoc would be to
the tranquillity of the home. Certainly the success of the sacred institution of
marriage must depend in large degree upon harmony between the spouses, and the
relationship could easily be disrupted and the lines of offspring blighted if bickerings
blossomed into law suits and conjugal disputes into vexatious, if not expensive
litigation. 47 So.2d, at 776.
208. The court alluded to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), where the court expressed the view that any change in the
law so far reaching as to obliterate the common law unity, should only be wrought by
language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention.
209. Supra note 206, at 776.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
by the prohibition of interspousal tort actions.210 This rationale is also
applied to premarital torts. 1 '
Florida adopts the majority position in negating the immunity rule
when vicarious liability is involved. In Webster v. Snyder,212 the court
held that while an injured woman's subsequent marriage to an employee
who negligently caused her injuries terminates any cause of action against
him, she can still maintain an action against his employer. Similarly in
May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co.,21 3 the court held that a wife's disability
to sue her husband for personal injuries did not relieve the owner of the
automobile from liability for injuries sustained as a result of her hus-
band's negligence. These decisions indicate that Florida, while adopting
the position of the majority of jurisdictions that adhere to the immunity
rule, has cast aside the rationale that to allow interspousal tort actions
would be to encourage fraud against third parties.
Unlike some states, Florida remains consistent in applying the
immunity doctrine to actions by the wife or her estate against the
husband or his estate. In Sullivan v. Sessions,21 4 the wife's administrator
brought an action under the Survival Statute21 5 against the administrator
of the husband who had murdered his wife and then committed suicide.
The court denied recovery on the basis that the wife during her lifetime
would have no right of action against her husband and therefore her
personal representative stands in her shoes and has no greater rights than
she would have.21 6 In the companion case of Shiver v. Sessions,21 the
minor children were allowed to recover against the estate of the step-
father under the Wrongful Death Act.218 The court resolved any apparent
inconsistencies by holding that the Wrongful Death Act creates in the
beneficiaries an entirely new cause of action for injuries suffered by
them, and is independent of any suit the wife might have brought if she
had lived.219
210. Supra note 207.
211. In Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), the court held that
the wife's cause of action against her husband for injuries sustained prior to the marriage due
to her husband's negligence was not cancelled or purged by the marriage, but rather her right
of action was abated or suspended by the marriage.
212. 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
213. 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
214. 80 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955).
215. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1965).
216. Supra note 214, at 707. See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Ake v.
Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1946).
217. 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
218. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01-.02 (1965).
219. Supra note 217, at 907. The court re-emphasized the fact that the interspousal
immunity rule was inapplicable and that the trend of the courts is to allow recovery against
a husband or his estate, in an action by or for the benefit of children for damages sustained
by reason of the unlawful killing of their mother. E.g., Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101
N.E.2d 547 (1951); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952); Kaczorowski v.
Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 AUt. 663 (1936) ; Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 (Wash.
1954). See also Epps v. Railway Express Agency, 40 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1949).
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The first and only direct attack on the Florida courts' position was
made by the Federal District Court in Alexander v. Alexander.220 The
court held that the "interspousal immunity" doctrine as recognized by
the Florida courts is unconstitutional:
[T]he common law of Florida has been abrogated by the Con-
stitution of the United States, and by the Constitution of the
State of Florida and that one spouse can now sue another in the
State of Florida for tortious acts committed by one spouse upon
the other spouse . .221
This opinion was predicated on the fact that both the Florida Constitu-
tion222 and the United States Constitution2  provide that every person is
entitled to protection under the law. The court did not recognize, and
specifically abridged, the common law fiction that husband and wife are
one person.
While the Florida courts are not bound by the Alexander decision, it
is indicative of a trend that will ultimately cause the complete disposal of
this archaic common law doctrine. The Florida Supreme Court in Shiver
v. Sessions224 stated that "it is settled law in this jurisdiction that the
wife's disability to sue her husband for his tort is personal to her, and
does not inhere in the tort itself." '225 This statement indicates that the
wife has a separate legal existence and that the unity theory is becoming
passe. If the Florida courts adopt this realistic stance, it follows that the
only rationale for supporting the immunity theory is public policy.226 With
the liberal divorce laws in effect in Florida, and the public policy argu-
ments questionable if not actually untenable, this writer believes that the
Florida Supreme Court will shed the cloak of antiquity and destroy,
demolish and abrogate the interspousal immunity doctrine.
XII. CONCLUSION
A growing number of courts are recognizing that the interspousal
immunity doctrine is without justification in our modern civilization.
220. 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. S.C. 1956). The court sitting in South Carolina applied
Florida law.
221. Id. at 929. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Florida held in Wailer
v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931), that the English common law
may be abrogated by the Constitution and laws of Florida when such common law is
contrary to the intendments, effect, purpose, and object of § 4 of our Declaration of Rights.
222. FLA. CONST. DECL. oF RiGHTs § 4 provides that every person shah have a remedy
in this state for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation.
223. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
224. Supra note 217.
225. Id. at 907.
226. Even though common law disabilities of married women have now been
removed in many states, as in Florida, by Emancipation Acts such as ours, it is
generally held that the rule should still be adhered to either on the ground that the
Emancipation Act in question did not completely destroy the common law fiction of
the unity of husband and wife, or on the ground that domestic tranquillity is
fostered by the prohibition of actions by a wife against her husband for his torts
against her. Id. at 906.
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Women now hold title to a significant portion of the nation's wealth. They
play a decisive role in the industrial life of the country and have risen to
the heights of congressional and cabinet positions. 27 Before blindly
applying a common law rule or concept, the courts should carefully
determine whether modern social and economic change has in effect
vitiated the purpose of the rule. What has been accomplished in the past
is but one factor in determining the course of the law. The interspousal
immunity rule should be abrogated simply because it is predicated on a
foundation which no longer exists. In summation the words of Lord Coke
seem quite appropriate:
"Blessed be the amending hand." '228
227. See Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
228. See State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957) quoting from Coke's
Fourth Institute.
